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I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews Texas family law cases from federal and Texas
courts during the Survey period from December 1, 2017, through Novem-
ber 30, 2018. The article excludes cases involving the Texas Department
of Family and Protective Services, the Texas Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral, and county Domestic Relations Offices. More than 279,000 new
family law cases were filed in 2017.1 The number of cases reported annu-
ally exceeds the authors’ ability to report. Accordingly, the authors have




A. SVEEN V. MELIN
In Sveen v. Melin,2 the United States Supreme Court upheld a Minne-
sota statute enacted in 2002 that automatically revoked beneficiary desig-
nation of a former spouse upon dissolution of marriage.3 Retroactive
application of the statute to designations made before it was enacted was
also at issue. Kaye Melin and Mark Sveen were married in 1997. The
following year, Sveen designated Melin as beneficiary of his Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company life insurance policy. He designated his adult
children as contingent beneficiaries for the policy.4 Melin and Sveen di-
vorced in 2007. There was no reference to the Metropolitan Life policy in
their decree. Sveen passed away in 2011 without changing the beneficiary
on the policy. After Sveen’s death, Melin and the Sveen children filed
competing claims for the insurance proceeds. The Sveens argued that the
2007 divorce triggered the automatic revocation of Melin as beneficiary
of the life insurance policy. Melin argued that applying the 2002 Minne-
sota statute retroactively to a 1998 beneficiary designation would violate
the Contracts Clause of the Constitution by allowing a state statute to
impair a contract.5
The district court granted summary judgment to the Sveens. Relying on
1. Office of the Court Admin., Annual Statistical Report for the Texas Judiciary 10
(2017), http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1441398/ar-fy-17-final.pdf.
2. 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1818 (2018).
3. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 524.2-804, subd. 1 (2016)). Texas Family Code Chapter 9
addresses revocation of designation of an ex-spouse as beneficiary of life insurance pro-
ceeds and retirement benefits. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.301-302. Footnote 1 of the Sveen
opinion lists statutory references for twenty-six states that have a revocation-upon-dissolu-
tion statute. Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1819 n.1.
4. Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1821.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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its previous decision in Whirlpool Corp. v. Ritter,6 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that application of the 2002
statute to a pre-existing designation violated the Contracts Clause. The
Eighth Circuit focused on the policyholder’s expectations when the desig-
nation was made. Circuit Judge W. Duane Benton reasoned that retroac-
tive application of the statute impaired the contract obligation by
disrupting the policyholder’s right to, “rely on the law governing insur-
ance contracts as it existed when the contracts were made.”7 The Su-
preme Court granted review and, in an 8–1 decision, reversed the Eighth
Circuit.8 Justice Elena Kagan set out a two-step test for determining if a
state law disrupts a contractual agreement. First, whether the state law is
“a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.”9 If substantial
impairment is found, does the law advance a significant public purpose in
a reasonable way?10 The Court upheld the revocation-upon-dissolution
statute finding it did not substantially impair the contract.11 Justice Kagan
explained the three aspects of the statute that save it from impairing the
contract: (1) by reflecting the policyholder’s intent the statute supports,
rather than impairs, the contract; (2) by following what a divorce court
could do to the statute provides adherence to the policyholder’s expecta-
tions; and (3) by supplying a default rule, that can be easily undone by the
policyholder.12 With Sveen as precedent, practitioners can rely on Texas’s
revocation-upon-dissolution statute13 and retroactive application of it,
but best practice is to remind your clients to review and re-designate ben-
eficiaries after their divorce is finalized.
III. OBERGEFELL PROTECTIONS
A. PIDGEON V. TURNER
On December 4, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court denied petition for cer-
tiorari of the Pidgeon v. Turner decision, allowing the Texas Supreme
Court’s decision to stand.14 At issue in the case was whether the City of
Houston is permitted to offer benefits to same-sex spouses of government
6. 929 F.2d 1318, 1324 (8th Cir. 1991).
7. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Melin, 853 F.3d 410, 413 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Whirlpool Corp., 929 F.2d at 1323).
8. Justice Neil Gorsuch dissented. After reviewing the framer’s intent behind the
Contracts Clause and the results of several decades of judicial erosion of the inviolability of
existing contracts, Gorsuch zeroed in on the retroactive application of the statute as uncon-
stitutional. He found application of the later-enacted statute to an existing contract not
only an impairment but an elimination of Melin’s contractual remedies. Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at
1827–30 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). To answer the question we posed last year in footnote 8
of our family law survey, Justice Gorsuch leans towards judicial rigidity.
9. Id. at 1817, 1821–22 (Kagan, J., majority).
10. Id. at 1822. Since the statute does not substantially impair the contract, the Court
did not address whether it was reasonable for advancement of “a significant and legitimate
public purpose.”
11. Id. at 1826.
12. Id. at 1822.
13. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.301.
14. Pidgeon v. Turner, 138 S. Ct. 505 (2017).
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employees in light of the Obergefell decision.15 Last year, the Texas Su-
preme Court deferred determining the scope of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Obergefell protections when it reversed the court of appeals decision, va-
cated the trial court decision, and remanded to allow the parties to fully
develop and litigate their positions.16
In an effort to shift the fight to federal court, Houston asked to move
the case to the U.S. Southern District Court in March 2018, but Judge
Kenneth Hoyt ruled that the city did not prove federal court was the
proper venue.17 On July 2, 2018, Pidgeon filed a motion for summary
judgment requesting that Mayor Turner and the City of Houston be en-
joined from extending spousal benefits to same-sex spouses of city em-
ployees because Texas Family Code Section 6.204(c)(2) prohibits this
extension. The motion also asserted that Houston could comply with both
the Obergefell and Pavan rulings and Texas Family Code Section
6.204(c)(2) by withdrawing spousal benefits from all city employees.18 On
January 1, 2019, Judge Sonya L. Heath took the bench in the 310th Dis-
trict Court of Harris County, so a Democratic trial judge will preside over
the remanded case.19
B. MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP
The U.S. Supreme Court found constitutional protection for a baker
who asserted his right to free exercise of religion protected him from be-
ing compelled to provide a wedding cake to a same-sex couple.20 Colo-
rado baker Jack Phillips refused to make a wedding cake for a same-sex
couple because his religious views opposed same-sex marriage. The
couple filed a complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission
(Commission) claiming Phillips’s refusal violated the Colorado Anti-Dis-
crimination Act (CADA) prohibition against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.21 The discriminatory conduct was Phillips’s denial of
“full and equal service” because they were a gay couple.22 The Commis-
sion found Phillips violated the CADA and the Colorado state court af-
firmed the ruling.23 Phillips filed a petition for certiorari and the Supreme
Court accepted review. Justice Anthony Kennedy found “the Colorado
15. See Anna K. Teller & Donald E. Teller, Jr., Family Law, 4 SMU ANN. TEX. SUR-
VEY 161, 165–66 (2018) (for a full discussion of the history of Pidgeon).
16. Pidgeon v. Turner, 538 S.W.3d 73, 76 (Tex. 2017).
17. Pidgeon v. City of Houston, No. 4:18-cv-00675 (S.D. Tex. 2018), https://
txvalues.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Pidgeon-v-Turner-Order-Remanding-Case-And-
Awarding-Fees-4.10.2018.pdf. Houston was also ordered to pay Pidgeon and Hicks’ legal
fees.
18. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
19. See Harris Cty., Cumulative Report, TEX. GEN & SPECIAL ELECTIONS 25 (2018),
https://www.harrisvotes.com/HISTORY/20181106/cumulative/cumulative.pdf.
20. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1725–26 (2018).
21. Id.; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2014). This case was initiated in 2012
before Colorado legalized same-sex marriage.
22. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1725.
23. Id. at 1726–27; see Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 283 (2015).
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Civil Rights Commission’s consideration of this case was inconsistent
with the State’s obligation of religious neutrality” because the Commis-
sion was openly hostile to Phillips religious beliefs.24 The very narrowly
drawn decision does not hold that the Free Exercise Clause25 outweighs
Colorado’s public accommodation statute and should not be seen as a
blow to civil rights of same-sex couples.
IV. INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
A. BRACKEEN ET AL. V. ZINKE
A decision from the Northern District of Texas declared provisions of
the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)26 unconstitutional.27 Brackeen et
al. v. Zinke was initiated by the State of Texas and a Texas couple who,
after fostering an Indian child, sought to adopt him.28 Other foster par-
ents seeking to adopt Indian children joined the suit, as well as the states
of Louisiana and Indiana.29 Defendants include multiple federal agencies,
directors of the agencies, and four tribes who intervened.30 On April 26,
2018, both the individual plaintiffs and state plaintiffs moved for sum-
mary judgment seeking to have provisions of the ICWA and several
ICWA regulations declared unconstitutional. The plaintiffs claimed the
ICWA violates Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process re-
quirements, the Tenth Amendment, the non-delegation doctrine of Arti-
cle I of the Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and
improperly expanded the scope of the Indian Commerce Clause.31 After
determining that strict scrutiny was the proper standard of review of the
24. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723. Justice Kennedy examined the tran-
scripts of the Commission’s formal hearings and found their consideration of the case was
“neither tolerant nor respectful of Phillips’ religious beliefs.” Id. at 1731. Since the Court
held in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause
bars even ‘subtle departures from neutrality’ on matters of religion” the Commission’s
decision was not neutral. Id. at 1731 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I § 1.
26. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (1978); 25 C.F.R. pt. 23.
27. Brackeen et al. v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 536, 583 (N.D. Tex. 2018). Several
2016 ICWA regulations were also ruled invalid.
28. Id. at 525.
29. The foster parents are referred to collectively by the court as the Individual Plain-
tiffs and the three states are referred to as state plaintiffs. Id. at 519.
30. The defendants are referred to collectively as federal defendants include the U.S.
Department of the Interior and its Secretary Ryan Zinke in his official capacity; the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs and both its Director Bryan Rice and Principle Assistant Secretary
John Tahsuda III in their official capacities; and the Department of Health and Human
Services and its Secretary Alex M. Azar II. The collective Tribal Defendants are the Chero-
kee Nation, Oneida Nation, Quinalt Indian Nation and Morengo Band of Mission Indians.
Id. at 519–20.
31. Id. at 531. The Fifth Amendment text doesn’t include an equal protection clause
but courts apply the test used to evaluate Fourteenth Amendment equal protection viola-
tions when Fifth Amendment claims are made. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST.
amend. X; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2000); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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equal protection inquiry,32 Judge Reed O’Connor found the ICWA classi-
fication was not “narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental
interest”33 because the ICWA applied to potential Indian children who
will never be part of a tribe. Therefore, he held that the ICWA was
broader than necessary to meet the compelling government interest and
granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on their Fifth Amend-
ment Equal Protection claim.34 He further found that the ICWA dele-
gated to Indian tribes federal legislative authority in violation of Article I
of the U.S. Constitution.35 Additionally, he found that by ordering states
to follow certain federal standards in state child custody cases, the ICWA
violated the Tenth Amendment by infringing on matters reserved to the
states.36 Finally, Judge O’Connor found the ICWA’s accompanying bind-
ing regulations, known as the Final Rule, were invalid.37 He granted sum-
mary judgment.38
On December 3, 2018, the Fifth Circuit issued a stay of the Brackeen
decision and approved an expedited appeal.39 Briefing will be completed
before March 2019 under the expedited schedule.40 The authors antici-
pate the ruling will be modified.
B. IN RE J.J.T.
A tribe’s right to intervene under the ICWA was addressed in In re
J.J.T.41 In this case, a termination trial involving an Indian child occurred
and during the trial a representative of the tribe indicated during tele-
phone testimony that “I think we are intervening at this moment.”42 The
trial court held that the attempt to intervene was ineffectual because it
was untimely and not made in writing as required by the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure.43 In an opinion by Chief Justice Anne McClure, she held
that the ICWA allowed the tribe to intervene “at any point in the pro-
ceeding[s,]” including at the time of trial.44 Chief Justice McClure further
32. Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 531–34. Plaintiffs’ argued for application of strict
scrutiny because ICWA §§ 1915(a)–(b) rely on racial classification. Defendants countered
that §§ 1915(a)–(b) distinguished children based on political categories thus requiring the
less stringent rational basis standard. After a comprehensive discussion of ancestry as a
racial classification, tribal membership as a political classification and application of those
classifications to the ICWA, the plaintiffs’ argument prevailed.
33. Id. at 534–35 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003)).
34. Id. at 536.
35. Id. at 538.
36. Id. at 541.
37. Id. at 544–46.
38. Id. at 546.
39. Brackeen v. Cherokee Nation, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 36903, *6 (5th Cir. 2018).
40. Id.
41. In re J.J.T., 544 S.W.3d 874, 877 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.). The Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services (TDFPS) was a party to this case, so it
would usually be exclude from this Survey. However, with the Brackeen appeal pending in
the Fifth Circuit, additional discussion of the ICWA is warranted. Therefore, we reported
on In re J.J.T.
42. Id. at 877.
43. Id.; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 60.
44. In re J.J.T., 544 S.W.3d at 879.
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found that under federal preemption the tribe’s intervention did not need
to be in writing because the ICWA did not require the intervention be
written.45 Because the trial court did not allow the intervention at trial,
the case was remanded for a new trial.
V. INTERSECTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS AND FAMILY LAW
A. BOS V. SMITH
Texas Family Code Section 42.002 provides, “A person who takes or
retains possession of a child or who conceals the whereabouts of a child in
violation of a possessory right of another person may be liable for dam-
ages to that person.”46 Liability under Chapter 42 can arise from either
directly interfering with a possessory right of another or aiding one who
interferes with a possessory right of another.47 Section 42.001 defines pos-
sessory right as “a court-ordered right of possession.”48 In Bos v. Smith, a
father sued his child’s maternal grandparents for assisting their daughter
in interfering with his possession.49 The child was under three when the
parties divorced. The final decree gave the father standard visitation
when the child turned three in June 2008.50 On Friday, October 16, 2008,
the father attempted to pick the child up from the maternal grandparent’s
home as ordered. Although he had given notice earlier in the week of his
intention to pick up the child, the child was not at the grandparent’s
home. The father did not try to arrange a later pick up time. The follow-
ing day, the mother brought the child to the father’s home for a short
visit. Immediately after the visit, she filed a police report claiming a guest
at the father’s home had sexually abused the three-year-old during the
visit. The mother later changed her claim to assert that the father had
abused the child.51 Eventually, all abuse allegations were ruled out. In
2011, the mother agreed to terminate her parental rights to the child to
avoid jail time for violating the possession order.52 The father then sued
the grandparents for violating Texas Family Code Chapter 42, defama-
tion, and breach of fiduciary duty to the child.53
The 105th District Court of Nueces County, awarded the father $3.2
million for economic and mental-anguish damages arising from his Chap-
45. Id.
46. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 42.001(a).
47. Id. §§ 42.001–.009.
48. Id. § 42.001(2).
49. Bos v. Smith, 556 S.W.3d 293, 296–97 (Tex. 2018). The father and mother had two
children together, but the case arose around possession of only the older child; therefore,
we will reference only this child when referring to the parties’ child.
50. Id. at 297.
51. Id. at 297–98.
52. Id. at 298–99.
53. Id. at 299. The father joined the mother’s boyfriend, a psychologist and TDFPS
consultant, in the suit. The father did not sue the mother, but the grandparents designated
her as a responsible party to the suit. Id. at 298–99.
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ter 42 claim.54 On appeal, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals concluded
that the trial court’s finding of Chapter 42 violations by the grandparents
was supported by legal and factual evidence but reversed the award of
economic damages.55 The father and the grandparents brought cross-peti-
tions for Texas Supreme Court review, and review was granted.56 Finding
that the grandparents did not have “actual notice of the . . . contents of
the order” and that the father only proved that the grandparents partici-
pated in the single violation on October 16, 2008 of his possessory rights,
the supreme court rendered a take-nothing judgment.57
B. GUIMARAES V. BRANN
The First Houston Court of Appeals heard an appeal of Chapter 42 tort
awards in Guimaraes v. Brann.58 Christopher Brann brought a civil action
against his wife, Marcella Guimaraes, for interference with his possessory
rights under Texas Family Code Section 42.002(a) after Marcella took
their child to Brazil and failed to return as agreed.59 The trial court
awarded Christopher $425,767.27 in costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees;60
$2 million dollars for mental anguish and suffering;61 and $250,000.00 in
exemplary damages.62 The wife appealed. The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court ruling.63 This decision illustrates how effective Chapter 42
remedies are in cases where one parent tries to evade or circumvent a
Texas court’s jurisdiction.
C. COLLINS V. COLLINS
The Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) is designed to protect de-
fendants from costly litigation in lawsuits meant to censor or silence
them. The TCPA safeguards Texans’ First Amendment rights “to petition,
to speak freely, [and to] associate freely” while simultaneously protecting
54. Bos v. Smith, 492 S.W.3d 361, 374–75 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016, pet.
granted).
55. Id. at 394–95. The father agreed to a remittitur of the economic damage award.
56. Bos v. Smith, 556 S.W.3d 293, 299 (Tex. 2018).
57. Id. at 300–08.
58. Guimaraes v. Brann, 562 S.W.3d 521, 546 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018,
pet. filed). The case involved a complex subject-matter jurisdiction question about whether
the Harris County District Court lost subject-matter jurisdiction after a Brazilian court
ruled on a Hague Convention petition that the child was not required to return to the
United States. The appeals court found no error with the trial court continuing to exercise
jurisdiction over the case after the Brazilian court ruling. Id. at 529, 543.
59. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 42.002(a). In January 2013, Marcella signed agreed
temporary orders which included a geographic restriction of the child’s residence to Harris
County, Texas. In May 2013, she also entered into a Rule 11 Agreement that she would
return from Brazil with the child on a date certain. However, Marcella chose to stay with
the child in Brazil and initiate proceedings there. Guimaraes, 562 S.W.3d at 529–30.
60. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 42.006(a)(1).
61. See id. § 42.006(a)(2).
62. See id. § 42.006(b).
63. Guimaraes, 562 S.W.3d 546–48. On February 21, 2019, Marcella’s Rule 53.7(f) mo-
tion for extension of time to file a petition for review was granted.
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the rights of parties to file meritorious suits.64 Demonstrable damages are
necessary for a meritorious suit.65 Exercising the right to petition includes
“communication in or pertaining to . . . a judicial proceeding.”66 At the
start of a lawsuit, defendants asking for TCPA protections may plead for
dismissal and have a timely hearing.67 Discovery is suspended while the
motion for dismissal is pending and, if the suit is dismissed, the court must
order the plaintiff to pay costs and actual attorney’s fees.68 TCPA dismis-
sal is a two-step process. To prevail, the movant must show the suit was
“based on, relates to, or is in response to a party’s exercise” of one of the
protected rights, and the non-movant must prove a prima facie case for
their claims by clear and specific evidence.69 Mere notice pleading is in-
sufficient to support a prima facie case.70 The authors examine two 2018
TCPA cases originating with family law suits below. The first is Collins v.
Collins.71
Corinna and Bryant Collins divorced in 2007. About a year before they
divorced, Bryant entered into an employment contract with Carol Crane
Rigging & Lifting Technology, Inc. that included contingencies for possi-
ble future compensation.72 During the pendency of the divorce, Bryant
not only failed to disclose the Carol Crane contract in response to discov-
ery requests from Corinna but produced two false affidavits. In the affi-
davits, he and the owner of Carol Crane, David Martinez, Jr., denied that
Bryant was eligible for any deferred compensation from the company. In
2013, a business dispute between Bryant and Martinez regarding their
ownership interests in Carol Crane led to litigation. During the business
litigation, Bryant testified about a 2008 agreement that superseded his
2006 contract with Carol Crane.73
Bryant died in 2017. Corinna filed suit in probate court requesting par-
tition of Bryant’s interest in Carol Crane based on fraud and nondisclo-
sure claims stemming from the divorce. Bryant’s widow, Kelly Collins,
was administrator of the estate. She filed a TCPA motion to dismiss
Corinna’s suit alleging Corinna’s suit violated Bryant’s right to petition.
Kelly also complained that Corinna failed to make a prima facie case for
her claims, while she proved Bryant’s affirmative defense.74 “The probate
64. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.002. The TCPA is also referred to as an
anti-SLAPP statute because it discourages strategic lawsuits against public participation.
65. Id.
66. Id. § 27.001(4)(A)(i).
67. Id. §§ 27.003–.004.
68. Id. §§ 27.003(c), 27.009(a).
69. Id. § 27.003(a); see also In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 2015). The Lipsky
court explained that clear and specific evidence is not synonymous with the well-estab-
lished clear and convincing evidence standard. Id. at 589.
70. Collins v. Collins, No. 01–17–00817–CV, 2018 WL 1320841, *5 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] Mar. 15, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at
590–91).
71. Id. at *3.
72. Id. at *1.
73. Id. at *2.
74. Id.
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court denied Kelly’s motion to dismiss and she filed [an] interlocutory
appeal.”75 The First Houston Court of Appeals found by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Corinna’s suit was based on Bryant’s right of
petition because it was based on an affidavit from the divorce proceed-
ing.76 Turning to the second inquiry of the test, the court found Corrina
failed to make a prima facie case because she neglected to prove each of
the elements of her claim because only her pleadings were in the appel-
late record.77 Justice Michael Massengale dismissed Corinna’s suit and
remanded the case to the probate court for determination of Kelly’s
damages.78
D. SMITH V. MALONE
In Smith v. Malone, a mother tried unsuccessfully to have the father’s
original Suit Affecting Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR) petition dis-
missed under the TCPA.79 Although the mother alleged that the father
filed his petition in retaliation of her right to petition the Office of the
Attorney General for child support, the Dallas Court of Appeals declined
to address whether the TCPA applied to the father’s suit and focused on
the second step of the inquiry. The court found the father, as a parent and
the admitted father of the child, met the burden of proving his prima
facie case to seek a conservatorship order because the mother admitted
Malone was the father and a father has a right to seek a conservatorship
order.80 The father proved by clear and specific evidence his prima facie
case, and the mother failed to raise an affirmative defense; consequently,
the father prevailed. On January 22, 2019, the mother filed a petition for
review by the Texas Supreme Court which was denied.81
Collins and Malone demonstrate the potential minefield the TCPA may
cause for family law practitioners. Corrina Collins had a persuasive situa-
tion but failed because she relied on her pleadings. Practitioners who
wish to defeat the TCPA dismissal provisions need to file thorough re-
sponses that address every element of their claims. This is counter intui-
tive for family law practitioners since the family code requires only notice
pleadings.82 Malone prevailed largely due to Ms. Smith’s admission.
75. Id.
76. Corinna argued that the TCPA was inapplicable to her suit because divorce is a
private matter, not one of public concern. The court was unpersuaded with this argument
because the TCPA definition of the right to petition does not include the words “matter of
public concern.” Id. at *3–4.
77. Id. at *5.
78. Id.
79. Smith v. Malone, No. 05–18–00216–CV, 2018 WL 6187639 (Tex. App.—Dallas,
Nov. 27, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
80. Id. at *3.
81. Smith v. Malone, No. 19-0074, 2019 Tex. LEXIS 318 (Tex. Mar 29, 2019).
82. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.402.
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VI. STANDING
A. IN RE H.S.
To settle an appeals court split of authority, the Texas Supreme Court
granted petition for review of In re H.S. in September 2017.83 The split of
opinion hinged on the actual care and control requirement of Texas Fam-
ily Code Section 102.003(a)(9) for a non-parent to have standing.84 The
sole issue in In re H.S. was whether grandparents have standing to file an
original petition for modification seeking conservatorship of their grand-
daughter.85 In a 5–4 decision, the supreme court found standing for the
grandparents and remanded the case to the trial court.86
The court began its analysis of Texas Family Code Section 102.003 by
looking at the six-month possession requirement. Section 102.003(b) di-
rects the court to consider the child’s principal residence during the rele-
vant six months when determining if a non-parent meets the time
requirement for standing.87 If, as in this case, the child’s primary resi-
dence was with the non-parent, then the possession requirement is met.
The supreme court then turned to the actual care and control require-
ments. Writing for the majority, Justice Debra Lehrmann explained the
lower courts and dissent focus, “on the parents’ conduct in evaluating
nonparent standing, but the statute by its plain terms focuses on the
nonparent’s role in the child’s life.”88 Based on the plain language of the
statute, the supreme court concluded that a non-parent who provides
comfort to a child meets the actual care requirement and a non-parent
who has the power to direct the child, even if the power is neither exclu-
sive nor legal, meets the actual control requirement.89 It further found
that nothing in the statute requires that the parents relinquish their rights
to the non-parent or that the parent intend to leave a child with the non-
parent permanently.90 Instead, a non-parent’s standing stems from their
relationship with the child. Applying the statutory requirements to the
facts, the supreme court found H.S.’s grandparents met the requirements
for actual care, control and possession.91
The supreme court then distinguished In re H.S. from Troxel v. Gran-
ville92 by explaining that the Washington statute at issue in Troxel was too
broad, while Texas Family Code Section 102.003(a)(9) is appropriately
83. In re H.S., 552 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. granted); see Teller
& Teller, supra note 15, at 161, 173–74 (discussing the split authority).
84. To maintain standing, the non-parents must have actual care, control, and posses-
sion of the child for a least six months ending not more than ninety days before the suit is
filed. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9).
85. Id.
86. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 163 (Tex. 2018). This opinion continues the supreme
court trend of strict interpretation of Family Code statutes.
87. Id. at 156.
88. Id. at 159.
89. Id. at 157–58.
90. Id. at 159.
91. Id. at 160.
92. 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000).
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narrow as it only confers standing on non-parents who have assumed a
parental role in a child’s life for at least six months.93 As the Austin Court
of Appeals reasoned in a 2011 case addressing standing of a non-parent,
“[U]nlike the statute in Troxel, [S]ection 102.003(a)(9) does not violate a
parent’s right to make decisions regarding their children; rather, it im-
poses potential legal consequences for certain types of parental deci-
sions.”94 In this instance, the parents’ decision to leave the child with the
grandparents gave the grandparents standing, and the case was remanded
for a decision on the merits of conservatorship.
VII. SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE AND ALIMONY
A. DALTON V. DALTON
The Texas Supreme Court firmly answered no to the question of
whether a Texas court could use Texas enforcement vehicles to enforce
out-of-state orders beyond the extent it could use those same vehicles to
enforce Texas orders.95 In Dalton v. Dalton, an Oklahoma separation
agreement with provisions for spousal support was properly filed in the
Texas trial court and was incorporated in the decree as a final order. The
amount and duration of the support exceeded what is permissible for stat-
utory maintenance in the Texas Family Code. Almost immediately upon
entry of the decree, Carol Dalton initiated enforcement proceedings al-
leging support arrearages and requesting a wage withholding order for
child and spousal support. She later filed another petition for a qualified
domestic relations order (QDRO). Bart Dalton filed motions opposing
both the wage withholding order and issuance of a QDRO. After the trial
court signed a wage withholding order and a QDRO assigning Carol a
portion of Bart’s retirement as payment for spousal support arrearages
and attorney’s fees, Bart appealed. On appeal, Chief Justice James
Worthen modified the arrearage amount but otherwise affirmed the trial
court ruling.96 Bart petitioned the Texas Supreme Court for review and it
was granted. The three issues Bart presented are: (1) does giving full faith
and credit to a foreign judgment allow a Texas Court to enforce a spousal
support obligation originating from a final out-of-state order via wage
withholding, or is enforcement via wage withholding limited to statutory
spousal maintenance awards under Texas Family Code Chapter 8?97; (2)
is it unconstitutional under Texas Family Code Section 8.101 to allow gar-
nishment of wages for payment of spousal support originating from a fi-
nal out-of-state order if the award fails to meet the Texas statutory
93. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 161–62.
94. Jasek v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 348 S.W.3d 523, 536 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2011, no pet.).
95. Dalton v. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d 126, 142 (Tex. 2018).
96. Dalton v. Dalton, No. 12–15–00203–CV, 2017 WL 104639 at *7 (Tex. App.—Tyler
Jan. 11, 2017, pet. granted) (mem. op.).
97. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003(a);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.001–8.305.
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requirements for court ordered maintenance?98; and (3) in a post-divorce
enforcement of spousal support, is issuance of a QDRO to divide an em-
ployer retirement plan covered by the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act (ERISA) permissible?99
As to question one, the supreme court acknowledged that the
Oklahoma judgment is “entitled to full faith and credit” because it was
properly filed in the Texas trial court. But, the supreme court found rec-
ognition of the Oklahoma judgment did not require application of
Oklahoma law for enforcement.100 Citing U.S. Supreme Court precedent,
Justice Jeffrey Boyd explained that the full-faith-and-credit clause does
not require Texas to “adopt the practices of other [s]tates regarding the
time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments.”101 He ex-
plained that not all Texas enforcement remedies for court-ordered
spousal maintenance awards extend to court-approved voluntary contrac-
tual support and confirmed that enforcement of spousal support via wage
withholding is limited to statutory spousal maintenance awards under
Chapter 8.102
As to question two, the Texas constitution prohibits garnishment of
wages except for enforcement of court-ordered child support or spousal
maintenance.103 Here the trial court approved Bart’s agreement to pay
support alimony,104 as opposed to ordering him to pay spousal mainte-
nance. Carol failed to raise the issue of her eligibility to receive Chapter 8
spousal maintenance at trial, so neither the final decree nor the trial re-
cord address it.105 On review, Carol did not argue that she was eligible for
court-ordered maintenance or that she had been denied opportunity to
request such. Absent a finding of eligibility under Chapter 8, Bart’s sup-
port alimony “falls outside of Chapter Eight,” and the Texas constitution
prohibits enforcement via wage withholding.106
As to question three, Carol relied on § 1056(d)(3) of ERISA as author-
ity for seeking a post-decree QDRO to enforce Bart’s support alimony
obligation.107 Bart countered that no Texas remedy provides for a post-
decree QDRO that alters the property division in the prior order. The
supreme court addressed Carol’s ERISA argument first and concluded
that “ERISA preempts any Texas law relating to employee benefit plans,
98. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.101.
99. See Employee Retirement Income Security Program, 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (2014).
100. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 135–36.
101. Id. at 136 (quoting Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998)).
102. Id.; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.001.
103. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28.
104. Support alimony is more commonly known as contractual alimony by Texas
practitioners.
105. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 134. In her concurring opinion, Justice Lehrmann advocated
for “a former spouse . . . at the time she seeks enforcement to establish that she was eligi-
ble for Chapter 8 spousal maintenance at the time of the divorce.” Id. at 144. (Lehrmann,
J., concurring).
106. Id. at 134 (majority opinion) (citing In re Green, 221 S.W.3d 645, 647–48 (Tex.
2007)); TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28.
107. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (2014).
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but here, there is no Texas law that ERISA would preempt.”108 Justice
Boyd then looked to Family Code Chapters 8 and 9.109 Chapter 8 ad-
dresses court-ordered support; Bart’s support is contractual, so it does
not apply.110 Chapter 9 governs post-decree proceedings and prohibits
subsequent orders that alter the property division of the prior order.111
Since “trial courts are ‘without authority to enter a QDRO altering the
terms of the decree,’” the QDRO was an impermissible enforcement
remedy.112
Justice Lehrmann’s concurring opinion declared the majority opinion’s
reading of Chapter 9, Subchapter B is “overly restrictive.”113 She argued
that, “[a] court does not redivide marital property by enforcing a judg-
ment for delinquent child support or spousal maintenance against the
payee spouse’s retirement benefits.”114 Nonetheless, Dalton seems to
eliminate the ability to use a QDRO to collect past due support from a
previously divided retirement account.
B. WALDROP V. WALDROP
Waldrop v. Waldrop presents the difficulties when attempting to blend
statutory Chapter 8 spousal maintenance and contractual alimony.115 In
Waldrop, Husband agreed that Wife was eligible for Chapter 8 spousal
maintenance and agreed to pay Wife maintenance. But Husband then
agreed to pay amounts in excess and for a longer period than was allowed
under Chapter 8 at the time.116 Husband agreed to pay $3,000 per month
until Wife began receiving pension income and to pay the difference be-
tween the pension amount and $3,000 indefinitely unless certain events
occurred. One such event was phrased as “further orders of the Court
affecting the spousal maintenance obligation, including a finding of co-
habitation by [Wife]” (Spousal Maintenance Phrase).117 After six years of
payments, Husband filed to modify the payments, arguing that it was
modifiable under Chapter 8 or under terms of the contract. The trial
court held that the alimony was contractual alimony, not Chapter 8 main-
tenance, and was not modifiable, and even if Chapter 8 applied, a mate-
rial and substantial change in circumstances required under Chapter 8
108. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 137.
109. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ch. 8 & 9.
110. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 138; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ch. 8. This opinion highlights
how critical it is to pursue Chapter 8 maintenance for eligible clients, as the enforcement
remedies for court ordered support have significantly more teeth.
111. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.007(a)–(b).
112. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 140 (citing Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 449 (Tex.
2003)); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.101.
113. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d at 147. (Lehrmann, J., concurring).
114. Id.; see Hogle v. Hogle, 732 N.E.2d 1278, 1284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
115. Waldrop v. Waldrop, 552 S.W.3d 396 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.).
116. Id. at 400. In 2007, the maximum Chapter 8 spousal maintenance that could be
awarded was three years at $2,500 per month. This has since increased to up to ten years
for marriages over thirty years at up to $5,000 per month.
117. Id.
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had not occurred.118
Now-former Husband appealed. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals first
affirmed in 2016 but later granted a request to rehear the case en banc,
and it filed a new opinion during our Survey period.119 On rehearing, the
court of appeals reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court,
finding that the payments constituted contractual alimony instead of
Chapter 8 alimony. However, the court of appeals found that the Spousal
Maintenance Phrase was a contractual provision which allowed the court
to consider modifying the obligation.120
In light of this opinion, the phrase “further order of the court” in
Spousal Maintenance Phrases should be avoided when establishing an ob-
ligation in excess of the Chapter 8 limitations or contractual alimony obli-
gation. If the intent is to make the obligation modifiable, the drafter
should clearly define the circumstances warranting such a change.
VIII. MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
A. WILLIAMS V. FINN
Both Houston courts of appeals decided interesting mediated settle-
ment agreement (MSAs) cases this year. In Williams v. Finn, the First
Houston Court of Appeals ruled that a MSA was enforceable even if it
was not rendered as a final order.121 Brian Williams and Devinah Finn’s
agreed final decree was signed in 2009. Finn filed a SAPCR modification
in 2011. The parties reached settlement agreements as to the modification
in April 2012 and December 2014. In early 2015, the parties filed compet-
ing proposed final orders and on March 6, 2015, the trial court signed
Willliams’s proposed order.122 Finn moved for a new trial on March 30,
2015, arguing the Williams’s order was not agreed to because it differed
from the terms of the 2012 and 2014 agreements. During the pendency of
Finn’s motion for new trial, the parties executed a third irrevocable MSA
that included an arbitration provision.123 The irrevocable agreement was
filed with the court on May 15, 2015, and in late May, Finn filed a pro-
posed order granting a new trial and vacating the March 6, 2015 order.124
The court did not sign the written order granting Finn a new trial, so the
motion was overruled by operation of law.125 In September 2015, Finn
filed another petition to modify that included a request for enforcement
118. Id. at 401.
119. Waldrop v. Waldrop, No. 02–15–00058–CV, 2016 WL 5449269 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Sep. 29, 2016), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reconsideration, 552 S.W.3d
396 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.).
120. Waldrop, 552 S.W.3d at 412.
121. Williams v. Finn, No. 01–17–00476–CV, 2018 WL 5071196, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 18, 2018, pet. filed) (mem. op. on reh’rg).
122. Id. at *1.
123. Id. These parties seem to like mediation but not the binding nature of MSAs.
124. Id.
125. TEX R. CIV. P. 329b.
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of the May 2015 MSA.126 She also filed to compel arbitration. Williams
filed a notice withdrawing his consent to the May 2015 MSA.127 The trial
court ordered the parties to arbitrate and entered a judgment based on
the arbitration award. Williams appealed.128
Justice Laura Carter Higley explained that Texas Family Code Section
153.0071(e) provides that parties are entitled to judgment on irrevocable
MSAs but the trial court is not required to render one.129 Further,
“[n]othing in the agreement prevented the parties from seeking other
ways of obtaining judgment on the agreement.”130 Presumably, the court
considered Finn’s September 2015 filings as an acceptable alternate
method of seeking judgement and the judgment based on the arbitration
award proper.
Williams argued that the order based on the arbitration award was void
because the May 2015 MSA expired and because he withdrew his consent
to it. The MSA included a provision that the parties’ attorneys would sign
an agreed order granting Finn’s new trial “for purposes of entry of an
order pursuant to the [agreement] only.”131 Williams reasoned that since
the agreement contemplated an order but no timely order was entered,
the MSA expired. Williams also maintained that the MSA was unenforce-
able because no order based on the agreement was rendered before the
trial court’s plenary power expired.132 He contended that Finn was re-
quired to appeal when the trial court declined to rendered judgment and,
by failing to appeal, she lost the right to seek judgment on the May 2015
MSA.133 The authors find Williams’s arguments persuasive but the court
of appeals did not. Justice Higley said the May 2015 MSA was not part of
Finn’s motion for new trial and did not become voidable when the trial
court’s plenary power expired.134 She also found that the agreement had
not expired.135 The court held that the parties were properly ordered to
arbitrate and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.136 Williams filed a peti-
tion for review in the Texas Supreme Court on January 14, 2019.
B. IN RE ATHERTON
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals’s In re Atherton decision
highlights the importance of including a disclosure provision in MSAs.137
126. Williams, 2018 WL 5071196, at *1.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *1–2.
129. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071(e). As a practical matter, practitioners need
courts to render judgments when a party is entitled to one. Clients expect their attorney to
have MSAs rendered as orders.
130. Williams, 2018 WL 5071196, at *5.
131. Id.
132. Id. at *2; see TEX R. CIV. PROC. 329b.
133. Williams, 2018 WL 5071196, at *2.
134. Id. at *2–3.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. In re Atherton, No. 14–17–00601–CV, 2018 WL 6217624 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Nov. 29, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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Diane Atherton and her husband, Richard Atherton, signed an MSA in
May 2016. A list of the parties’ assets and debts, including multiple
stocks, was referenced in the MSA and attached as Exhibit B. In the
course of the mediation, the current values for the stocks was obliterated
and no subsequent numerical value was assigned to them. Instead, the
stocks were marked as being awarded to Diane or Richard.138 About a
year later, Diane asked the trial court to set aside the MSA and grant her
a new trial. Her pleadings claimed Richard breached the MSA and com-
mitted fraud, claims that were supported in her accompanying affidavit.
Diane filed an additional motion claiming that at the time of the media-
tion she did not have sufficient financial information to understand the
property division. That motion was not supported by an affidavit. Richard
filed a motion for entry of judgment. At the hearing on the parties’ mo-
tions, Diane raised additional arguments she had not pled including that
she was induced to enter into the MSA by fraud and that the MSA was
ambiguous because the stock value was not disclosed. Diane served a trial
brief that raised the valuation argument on Richard before the hearing,
but did not file the brief with the court. No affidavit accompanied the
trial brief and she did not offer evidence or offer of proof at the hearing.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court heard testimony to prove-up
the MSA and directed the parties to file briefs on the stock valuation.139
Diane filed a timely brief but it was not supported by affidavits. After the
trial court rendered a final decree based on the 2016 MSA and denied
Diane’s motion for new trial, she appealed.140
The court of appeals found that Diane failed to present evidence that
raised a fact issue as to the value of the stocks or evidence of Richard’s
alleged fraud, misrepresentation, or failure to disclose.141 Additionally,
the MSA did not include a disclosure provision and spouses represented
by counsel in a divorce do not have a fiduciary duty to one another, so
Richard did not have a disclosure duty to Diane.142 The court’s review of
the MSA revealed that each asset was unambiguously awarded to one of
the parties, so Diane’s ambiguity argument also failed.143 The court af-
firmed the trial court decision.144 On January 22, 2019, Diane’s Rule
53.7(f) motion for extension of time to file a petition for review was
granted.145
138. Id. at *1–2.
139. Id. at *2.
140. Id.
141. Id. at *3–4.
142. Id. at *4. Cf. Boyd v. Boyd, 67 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
143. In re Atherton, 2018 WL 6217624, at *5–6. Diane failed to properly raise the issue
of ambiguity of the MSA, but determining if a contract is ambiguous is a question of law;
therefore, the issue was addressed by the court.
144. Id. at *6.
145. TEX. R. APP. P. 53.7(f).
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C. IN RE RUSSELL AND IN RE T.L.T.
After the expiration of the trial court’s plenary power, Wife moved for
a nunc pro tunc judgment to correct variances, including terms for divi-
sion of Husband’s retirement, between the parties’ MSA and the final
decree.146 The trial court granted the motion and Husband appealed. The
Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the re-
quested changes were substantive instead of clerical, and that the provi-
sion in the decree providing that it controlled conflicts with the MSA
prohibited substantive modifications after expiration of the trial court’s
plenary power.147 Neither the decree nor the prove-up hearing record
specifically incorporated the terms of the MSA into the judgment. If
judgment had been rendered on the terms of the MSA, perhaps a better
argument for a clerical error could have been made.
The parties to In re T.L.T. signed a MSA requiring post-mediation pro-
duction of evidence of separate property by a date certain.148 The MSA
also provided for an equal split of community retirement. Husband failed
to proffer evidence of his separate property retirement and the trial court
awarded each party 50% of all retirement funds. Husband moved for a
new trial arguing the decree was inconsistent with the MSA. His motion
for new trial was denied and he appealed. The Dallas Court of Appeals
affirmed entry of the final judgment finding that equal division of the
retirement assets was not an abuse of discretion absence evidence of sep-
arate property.149
IX. SUPPORT OF CHILDREN AND ADULT
DISABLED CHILDREN
A. IN RE C.J.N.-S.
Several important cases on child support variances occurred during the
Survey period. One Texas Supreme Court case dealt with adult disabled
children. In re C.J.N.-S. dealt with a disabled child that began to live
alone, with financial help from his mother, after turning eighteen.150
Mother sought support from the child’s Father and the trial court granted
support. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals found that the Mother
lacked standing because she did not have physical possession of the
child.151 The statute specified that an adult disabled child support suit
may be filed by “a parent of the child or another person having physical
custody or guardianship of the child under a court order.”152 The case
146. In re Russell, 556 S.W.3d 451, 453–54 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no
pet.). The decree omitted Wife’s award in the MSA of $201,000 from Husband’s 401(k) and
eleven monthly $750.00 payments from Husband to Wife.
147. Id. at 459–61.
148. In re T.L.T., 2018 WL 1407098, *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
149. Id. at *3.
150. In re C.J.N.-S., 540 S.W.3d 589, 590 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam).
151. Id. at 590.
152. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.303(a).
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turned on whether this phrase required the parent to have physical pos-
session of the child. After reviewing the legislative history of the statute
and noting that other sections of the family code considered child support
in situations where an adult disabled child may reside outside of a parents
home, the Texas Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, found that a
parent had standing to file such a suit even if they lacked physical posses-
sion of the child, and remanded the case back to the court of appeals to
address the remainder of the Father’s appellate points.153 On remand, the
court of appeals found the trial court’s rulings on the need and amount of
support were supported by the evidence and accordingly affirmed.154
B. IN RE K.F., R.F., AND T.F.
The requirements to show proven needs to obtain child support above
the statutory guidelines was the issue in In re K.F., R.F., and T.F.155 At a
child support modification trial, the trial court heard that Father’s income
had increased dramatically and raised his child support from $1,000 per
month to $4,365 per month. The court of appeals first explained that the
family code had a bifurcated analysis for setting child support: one for
Obligors at or below the statutory cap of net monthly resources (cur-
rently $8,550 per month), and another for Obligors with net resources in
excess of the statutory cap. The Father-Obligor in this case had net re-
sources of over $29,000 per month, allowing the court to award additional
support based upon the income of the parties and the “proven needs” of
the child.156 Only in the event that the “proven needs” exceeded the pre-
sumptive award at the statutory cap could the court award additional sup-
port.157 The court noted that there is no definition of “needs,” but that it
is more than the bare necessities but does not depend on the parent’s
ability to pay or the parent’s lifestyle.
To demonstrate the “proven needs,” Mother offered a spreadsheet and
testimony of the children’s current expenses.158 The court of appeals
found that merely offering the expenses was not the same and was not
evidence of their proven needs.159 Also, Mother failed to show how the
needs of the children had changed since the prior order in this case. The
court opined that if the needs of the children changed due to Mother’s
lifestyle changes, that would be insufficient to show that the children’s
needs changed.160 Because Mother failed to demonstrate that the proven
needs of the children exceeded the presumptive award, the appeals court
153. In re C.J.N.-S., 540 S.W.3d at 592–93.
154. In re C.J.N.-S., No. 13-14-00729-CV, 2018 WL 1870430, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi Apr. 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
155. No. 02-18-00187-CV, 2018 WL 6816119, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 31,
2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
156. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.126(a).
157. Id. § 154.126(b).
158. In re K.F., 2018 WL 6816119, at *5.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court.161
This case offers a textbook guide for seeking above guideline child sup-
port when an Obligor’s income is above the statutory cap. The practi-
tioner must focus on needs rather than expenses, and a modification case
must show that changing needs is not tied to a parent’s increasing
lifestyle.
X. PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS
A. IN RE LEHMAN
Premarital agreements are generally enforceable and presumptively
valid in Texas.162 Successful challenges require proof that the agreement
was either (1) not signed voluntarily; or (2) the agreement was uncon-
scionable when it was signed and before executing the agreement the
party against whom it is being enforced did not have fair disclosure, did
not waive disclosure in writing and did not have adequate knowledge of
the other parties’ assets and debts.163 Sherrie Lehman sought to invali-
date her prenuptial agreement on the basis that she did not sign it volun-
tarily.164 She filed a supporting affidavit that alluded to duress as proof
her execution was involuntary.165 Her husband’s motion for summary
judgment on the issue was granted and Sherrie appealed.166 Sherrie’s affi-
davit was pronounced conclusory by the court of appeals.167 The appel-
late court affirmed the trial court finding that there “was no genuine issue
of material fact as to voluntariness” of Sherrie’s execution of the agree-
ment.168 This case is a good reminder of how difficult it is to challenge
whether a premarital agreement was not signed voluntarily.
B. IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF I.C. AND Q.C.
Practitioners should approach challenges to prenuptial agreements that
contain no-contest clauses cautiously. The Texas Supreme Court applied
contract principals to determine if forfeiture under a premarital agree-
ment had been triggered.169 Jim and Becky were married in 2005.170
161. Id. at *6.
162. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.001–.010.
163. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006(a).
164. In re Lehman, No.14-17-00042-CV, 2018 WL 3151172, *1 (Tex App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] June 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
165. Id. at *2–3.
166. Id. at *1.
167. Id. at *3.
168. Id.
169. In re the Marriage of I.C. and Q.C., 551 S.W.3d 119 (Tex. 2018); see generally Beck
v. Beck, 814 S.W.2d 745, 748–49 (Tex. 1991).
170. In re I.C., 551 S.W.3d at 120. The parties to the suit are James (Jim) and Rebecca
(Becky) Dondero. Portions of the trial record and appeal were filed under seal. Footnote
one of the court of appeals decision explains that is why the wife was identified as Q.C. and
husband as I.C. in their opinion. In re the Marriage of I.C. and Q.C., 552 S.W.3d 291, 292
n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. granted). Aspects of the Dondero’s personal and profes-
sional lives collided during the divorce resulting in a lengthy divorce and filing of addi-
tional law suits. See Nathan Vardi, Dallas Financier Used Sources Described as Illegal to
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Under the terms of their prenuptial agreement Becky would receive a
lump-sum cash payment of five million dollars from Jim upon divorce.171
The award was subject to a no-contest clause that triggered forfeiture.172
The clause stated in relevant part, “[I]f Becky . . . seeks to recover prop-
erty in a manner at variance with this Agreement, then [Becky] shall for-
feit the cash payment set forth in Section 13(h).”173 Jim filed for divorce
in September 2011.174 During the protracted divorce, Jim failed to make
payments required under their prenuptial agreement and Becky filed
multiple amended counter-petitions asserting breach of contract
claims.175 In 2012, Becky filed a third amended counter-petition asserting
breach of contract, made her first argument in the alternative for reces-
sion of the prenuptial agreement, and moved for summary judgment.176
On appeal, Becky claimed that requesting recession as alternative relief
did not trigger forfeiture.177
The court found the language of the no-contest clause to be “clear con-
tractual language” prohibiting any attempt to seek property “at variance
with” the provisions of the premarital agreement.178 On de novo review,
the court found that Becky’s request for recession was an attempt to
change the terms of the prenuptial agreement, specifically to create com-
munity property. Further, Becky’s repeated requests of recession in her
pleadings and motion for summary judgment negated her argument that
recession was merely sought in the alternative. The court affirmed the
lower courts partial summary judgment and Becky’s loss of the cash pay-
ment.179 In a concurring opinion, Justice Lehrmann joined the majority
opinion in its entirety.180 In re I.C. highlights the importance of fully un-
derstanding the terms of a prenuptial agreement and discussing the risks
of asserting certain claims with your client before filing divorce pleadings.
C. IN RE VELDEKENS
Victor and Mari Veldekens executed a premarital agreement that
barred the creation of a community estate and required payment of op-
posing party’s attorney’s fees for unsuccessful challenges to the agree-
Track Wife, Former Business Partner Claims, FORBES (June 1, 2012), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2012/06/01/dallas-financier-used-sources-described-as-il-
legal-to-track-wife-former-business-partner-claims/#47f7eb9735b8.
171. In re I.C., 551 S.W.3d at 120.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 121.
174. Id.
175. In re I.C., 552 S.W.3d at 293.
176. In re I.C., 551 S.W.3d at 121.
177. Id. at 123.
178. Id. at 122.
179. Id. at 120.
180. Id. at 125 (Lehrmann, J., concurring); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006(a). Justice
Lehrmann posits that Texas Family Code § 4.006(a) may provide the exclusive means to set
aside a prenuptial agreement and thereby exclude recession as a remedy. Id.
152 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 5
ment.181 Article 10.1 of the agreement provided that “separate property
held by title” could be conveyed to the other spouse via deed or other
written instrument.182 The schedules attached to the agreement listed a
home on Columbia Street in Houston as Mari’s separate property.183
During their divorce proceedings, Victor claimed he purchased a one-half
interest in the Columbia Street property. As evidence of his ownership,
he provided a handwritten note from Mari “requesting $265 for taxes and
insurance as half owner.”184 The trial court confirmed the home as Mari’s
separate property and ordered Victor to pay $6,500 of Mari’s attorney’s
fees for the failed attempt to challenge the agreement.185 After asking the
trial court to file findings of fact, Victor appealed. The Fourteenth Hous-
ton Court of Appeals explained that Victor should have requested
amended findings of fact because, based on the filed facts, there was no
error with the trial court’s rejection of the handwritten note as a written
instrument conveying ownership, confirmation of the Columbia Street
home as wife’s separate property, or the attorney’s fees award.186 The
facts seem to support Victor’s position and the authors are left wondering
if he would have prevailed if he had challenged the findings of fact.
D. IN RE JA.D.Y.
In re Ja.D.Y., Jeffrey Younger fraudulently induced Anne Georgulas
into marriage by lying about his background, including his education, mil-
itary service, employment status, and income.187 Anne sought to annul
the marriage. The parties’ premarital agreement provided that any prop-
erty acquired during the marriage would be the separate property of the
party in whose name title was taken, regardless of how the purchase was
funded.188 During the marriage, Anne’s company purchased a truck that
Jeffrey had titled in his sole name.189 Anne testified that she did not con-
sent to putting the truck in her husband’s sole name.190 During their sep-
aration, Jeffrey sold the truck.191 The trial court annulled the marriage
and awarded wife $45,045.11 in damages for cash spent on the truck. Jef-
frey appealed.192
Justice Douglas Lang found legal and factual evidence supported the
annulment.193 Since the parties’ marriage was void and a “premarital
181. In re Veldekens, No. 14–16–00770–CV, 2018 WL 2727837, *1 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] June 7, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
182. Id. at *4–5.
183. Id. at *1.
184. Id. at *4.
185. Id. at *1.
186. Id. at *4.
187. In re Ja.D.Y., No. 05-16-01412-CV, 2018 WL 3424359, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas
July 16, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
188. Id. at *2.
189. Id. at *1.
190. Id. at *6.
191. Id. at *1.
192. Id.
193. Id. at *5.
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agreement becomes effective on marriage,” the prenuptial agreement was
unenforceable and would only be applied to avoid an inequitable prop-
erty division.194 Jeffrey argued that the truck was a gift and was titled in
his name with wife’s knowledge, but the court of appeals affirmed Anne’s
damage award.195
XI. CONCLUSION
During the Survey period the Pigeon v. Turner and Masterpiece
Cakeshop decisions addressed the evolving law regarding same-sex
couples. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld revocation-upon dissolution
statutes for life insurance in Sveen v.Melin, a decision that promotes cer-
tainty in post-divorce conflicts. The Texas Supreme Court resolved the
split authority on standing issues for non-parents. The year also brought
several cases to serve as guides for practitioners on best practices for
drafting MSAs and premarital agreements. The first cases addressing
Texas Citizen’s Participation Act application in family law matters were
also heard.
194. Id. at *6.
195. Id. These parties were parents of twins, and before the court of appeals issued this
ruling, mother, Dr. Georgulas, filed for a modification of the parent-child relationship. At
issue was whether one of the twins is gender expansive or transgendered. Gender expan-
sive describes individuals who behave in ways that broaden the commonly held definitions
of their natal gender. See First Amended Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relation, In re
Ja.D.Y., No. 05-16-01412-CV 2 (July 7, 2018).
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